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Knowledge Into Wisdom: 
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Beliefs to Construct a Wise 
University 
Susan M. Awbrey 
Oakland University 
David K. Scott 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
Philosopher Nicholas Maxwell argues that universities today are 
founded on a philosophy of knowledge that is too narrowly focused on 
solving the technical problems of specialized academic disciplines. 
Maxwell believes that the foundation for the university should be a 
new type of inquiry that would have as its aim the improvement of not 
only knowledge but personal and global wisdom-a type of inquiry 
that would help us address the larger, complex problems that threaten 
our society. The authors agree with Maxwell but submit that the 
university has already begun a transformation to the philosophy of 
wisdom. As evidence of this organizational transition, current debates 
within the academy which relate to the components of wisdom are 
analyzed. A model for the development of wisdom is presented and its 
stages compared to the historical development of the university. The 
authors argue that universities should both exemplify and foster 
wisdom. Instructional implications of the philosophy of wisdom are 
explored. 
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Since early Greek culture and before, wisdom has been prized. Plato's 
dialogues indicate a recognition that the concept of wisdom is multi-
faceted, referring to the ''pursuit of truth" through contemplation 
(sophia), to ''practical wisdom" (phronesis), and to a form of "scien-
tific" or natural knowledge ( episteme) (Robinson, 1990). Wisdom was 
based on the integration and harmony of these ideals. Our conception 
of wisdom is deeply embedded in our beliefs about how we come to 
know. 
As we enter a new century, we are seeing a revival of interest in 
the study of wisdom and the more balanced world view it represents. 
This resurgence is due in part to the search for a vision that will restore 
harmony and inspire us to meet the challenges of our time. Society is 
engaged in unprecedented upheaval and change. The values of indi-
vidualism and competitiveness upon which America was founded 
appear not only to be inadequate but in many ways antithetical to the 
teamwork and interdependence called for in a new global age. 
The workforce of tomorrow will require the ability to construct 
meanings from knowledge (abstraction), the ability to recognize con-
nections and interrelationships (systems thinking), the ability to reach 
beyond what is known (experimentation), and the ability to success-
fully work with others to achieve mutual goals (collaboration) (Reich, 
1991). These are not skills that can be acquired through spectator 
methods of education nor can they be apprehended through an educa-
tion focused on the accumulation of facts alone. Many voices, not only 
from outside but from within our universities, are calling for a change 
in our educational institutions (Atkinson, 1992; Bok, 1990; Rhodes, 
1993.) There is a growing recognition that universities, like institu-
tions of government and industry, are undergoing a fundamental 
transformation. To be successful, this transformation must reach to the 
very heart of the university and unveil the values and beliefs which 
form its foundation (Scott & Awbrey, 1993). 
Throughout history, society has expected universities to contrib-
ute to the development of effective citizens and to the solution of 
societal problems. By the late Middle Ages, there were ''pressures to 
harness education to professional, ecclesiastical, and governmental 
needs" (Klein, 1990). This pressure led to the rise of disciplines. It is 
interesting to note that it was external pressure which first led to the 
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profound specialization we experience today. Ironically, it is this very 
specialization that has created a gulf between the university and its 
ability to respond to the problems and issues society currently faces. 
Philosopher Nicholas Maxwell notes that universities today are 
founded on a philosophy of knowledge-they are focused too nar-
rowly on the limited, technical problems of specialized academic 
disciplines. He states that we need .. a new kind of inquiry [that] would 
have as its basic aim to improve, not just knowledge, but rather 
personal and global wisdom" (Maxwell, 1992, p.205). 
The .. official basic creed" of the academic enterprise is that 
''rational inquiry ought to help enhance the quality of human life by, 
first, improving knowledge. •• However, Maxwell reminds us that 
.. intellectual priority needs to be given to the dual tasks of articulating 
our problems of living, and proposing and criticizing possible solu-
tions ... Problems of knowledge and understanding need to be tackled 
as rationally subordinate to intellectually more fundamental problems 
of living" (Maxwell, 1984, p.3). Essentially, Maxwell is saying that 
universities must move from a limiting philosophy of knowledge to a 
philosophy of wisdom. We believe that this broader vision must be 
found if we are to inhabit a world in which people are prepared and 
willing to deliberate about issues that affect their lives and to take 
responsibility for decisions that will maintain and enhance democracy. 
In considering how a change to the philosophy of wisdom might 
impact our universities, it is first necessary to say what one means by 
wisdom. Many definitions from ancient to modem times have been 
offered. We cannot do justice here to this historical perspective. 
However, most concepts of wisdom view it as the end point of a 
process that encompasses the idea of making sound judgments in the 
face of uncertainty. It is how we address the deep, unstructured 
questions that life presents us. '"The essence of wisdom ... lies not in 
what is known but rather in the manner in which that knowledge is 
held and in how that knowledge is put to use" (Meacham, 1990). 
Wisdom then requires not only a knowledge base (factual and expe-
riential), but an awareness of the contextual nature of knowledge 
(awareness that one·s own views and those of others are interpreta-
tions), and awareness that knowledge is a temporary settlement based 
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on the current best evidence (recognition of uncertainty) (Kitchener 
& Brenner, 1990). 
Karen Strolun Kitchener and P.M. King have developed a model 
for the development of reflective judgment. Its stages include: 
1. Knowledge simply exists and, therefore, does not need justifica-
tion. Knowledge is concrete. 
2. Knowledge is absolutely certain, or certain but not immediately 
available. We can know directly or via authorities. 
3. Knowledge is absolutely certain or temporarily uncertain. In the 
areas of temporary uncertainty, we can know only via our intui-
tions or biases. 
4. Knowledge is idiosyncratic since situational variables dictate that 
we cannot know with certainty. 
5. Knowledge is contextual and subjective. Since what is known is 
known via perceptual filters, we cannot know directly. We may 
know only interpretations of the material world. 
6. Knowledge is personally constructed via evaluations of evidence, 
opinions of others, etc., across contexts; thus we may know our 
own and other's personal constructions of issues. 
7. Knowledge is constructed via the process of reasonable inquiry 
into generalizable conjectures about the problem at hand, e.g., 
which interpretation seems most probable based on the current 
evidence. (Adapted from Kitchener & Brenner, 1990, p.218) 
In these last stages we see the emergence of wisdom when there 
is awareness that knowledge 
must be constructed via critical inquiry or through the synthesis of 
opposing views. Such constructions often go beyond the evaluations of 
others' perspectives. Rather, they are generative, offering, much like 
[the biblical] Solomon, a new, more complete way to view the issue 
under consideration. (Kitchener & Brenner, 1990) 
Although wisdom is often associated with old age (Clayton & 
Birren, 1980; Erickson, 1982), empirical evidence is not adequate to 
draw such a conclusion, and older people appear less likely to endorse 
this age relationship than the young or middle-aged (Meacham, 1990). 
Still, even if the final stages of wisdom emerge at an age beyond that 
of many college students, we believe that it is the responsibility of 
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educational institutions to assist students to move through the stages 
of development toward wisdom. In addition to providing the student 
with a foundation, the university should also provide a model for 
wisdom in the environment it creates. Universities should not just 
foster wisdom but should exemplify it. 
Too often we view institutions as monoliths of bricks and mortar 
on which we can have little impact. Yet, organizations are made up of 
people. Their policies, procedures, administrations, operations are all 
determined by the people who inhabit them. They are, as Bellah, et al. 
(1991) note, patterned ways that people live together. Universities are 
institutions of people-people responding to their times. Because of 
this, we would like to use wisdom as a metaphor for how universities 
have developed to reflect the people who inhabit them and how some 
of the current issues within the university can be viewed from this 
perspective. We believe that the university itself has been struggling 
through the stages of development toward wisdom and that debates 
about aspects of wisdom have been occurring on many fronts -often 
without their participants identifying them as such. In short, we believe 
the transition from a philosophy of knowledge to a philosophy of 
wisdom has begun, however marginally, in higher education. 
Which Knowledge-Base? 
One very fundamental debate within the university has been the 
debate over canon. As we have seen, researchers identify a factual and 
experiential knowledge base as an important element of wisdom 
although not a sufficient condition for it (Meacham, 1990; Kitchener 
& Brenner, 1990). There has been a long-standing debate within the 
academy over what should form the fundamental knowledge base of 
the university. 
There are those like Robert Maynard Hutchins who contend that 
"Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowl-
edge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence education 
should be everywhere the same" (Oakley, 1992, p.125). This theme 
seems to have been taken up by many conservative critics for whom 
pluralism and multiculturalism have become the rocks upon which 
Western Civilization has foundered. It has, they believe, created a 
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"cultural relativism" that began in the 1960s (Bloom, 1987). However, 
Francis Oakley's (1992) work helps us to recognize that the "roots of 
the women's movement are deeply engaged in nineteenth-century 
soil"; that programs of study of what later became called the 'Third 
World" began in the 1950s; that the establishment of African-Ameri-
can studies was generated by the change in race relations that began 
after the Second World War; and that "the seeds of doubt about 
[Western civilization core-curriculum's] viability had begun to ger-
minate even before the 1950s" (Oakley, 1992, p.131). Thus, the rise 
of pluralism cannot be dismissed as simply an invention of radicals 
during the 1960s. If we examine Kitchener and King's model of 
wisdom, we also find that relativism is an important stage in the 
development of wisdom. It moves us from an authority based model 
of knowledge to one that recognizes the contextual nature of our 
knowing. 
As Benjamin Barber notes: 
There has been no single historical canon, but an evolving argu-
ment. And if the canon turns us into "Us", we in tum transform the 
canon into 'The Canon": It creates Us as we create It. As we are 
heterogeneous, our story in time necessarily becomes plural, plural in 
that each generation rewrites it, plural in that it must confront the reality 
of pluralism in the makeup of the nation. The more inclusive the story, 
the more pluralistic its plot. (Barber, 1992, p.27) 
The authors believe that to form a wise university it is important 
to maintain an historical perspective, a knowledge base if you will. 
We, like Tamas ( 1991 ), affirm the importance of history and recognize 
the project of Western Civilization as "a necessary and noble part of 
a great dialectic" which has prepared the way for a "larger synthesis". 
But we contend that the university's knowledge base must expand 
these boundaries. It must be not only inclusive but recognized as 
representing differing perspectives on the same events. 
Living with Uncertainty 
A second debate within the university centers on the tension 
between theory and practice. During the early stages of university 
history, the search for knowledge focused on the search for fixed, 
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antecedent invariants often attributed to the divine. Action and prac-
tical activity were eschewed as fraught with potential failure and 
frustration. The deep desire for certainty and freedom from risk is a 
natural human characteristic as "man who lives in a world of hazards 
is compelled to seek for security" (Dewey 1929/1988, p.3). Unfortu-
nately, according to John Dewey, this desire led to three mistakes in 
ancient thought: 
the ftrst, that certainty, security, can be found only in the ftxed and 
unchanging; the second, that knowledge is the only road to that which 
is intrinsically stable and certain; the third, that practical activity is an 
inferior sort of thing, necessary simply because of man's animal nature 
and the necessity for winning subsistence from the environment. 
(Dewey 1929/1988, p.41) 
With the rise of the scientific method, this search for invariants 
gave way to the search for constant relations among changes (Dewey 
1929/1988). Experiment replaced belief. This new acceptance of 
action was a primary step toward the development of a philosophy of 
wisdom, and society looked optimistically to science for bright, new 
solutions to its ills. However, recently, this optimism has waned. Is 
this because the idea of active inquiry is flawed? We submit that it is 
not inquiry that is flawed but only our narrow conception of it. The 
academy, through its specialization and reward structure, has limited 
inquiry to narrow forms of technical rationality (Schon, 1994). As 
Derek Bok points out, the problems that attract outstanding scholars 
are those susceptible to verifiable experiments while the large, ne-
glected societal problems appear value-laden and seemingly intracta-
ble (Bok, 1990, p.45). Lee Shulman (1994) comments that those parts 
of the university that most directly address the agenda for the improve-
ment of life and living-schools of social work, nursing, education-
are the most fragile, marginal, gendered, and vulnerable to closing or 
merger in times of budget crisis. Further, he notes that the investigators 
who are most successful in these schools are often those who embrace 
research paradigms that "flee the furthest" from the social ameliora-
tion and social change for which the schools were created. He calls 
this the process of "deconstruction to the closest relevant discipline"-
a process in which research in these professional schools is couched 
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in the jargon of disciplines that are seen as more prestigious and 
scientific. 
Donald Schon ( 1994) and others have suggested that new methods 
of inquiry must be identified to address the types of unstructured, 
real-life problems that are the center of Nicholas Maxwell's argument. 
Indeed, rather than being anti-action, these methods must be steeped 
in practice. According to Schon, most "civilizing problems" are of the 
type in which it is impossible to discriminate among hypotheses about 
what is going on. In order to deal with such problems, Schon suggests 
that we must become "reflective designers" under conditions of un-
certainty. Because we are unable to set out variables, we must reflect 
on the situation's "pattern causality." Pattern causality is the combi-
nation of design causality, in which things happen because you intend 
them to and act to bring about results, and efficient causality, in which 
your actions produce unintended consequences. Under conditions of 
pattern causality, we must look for causes by tracing back events in 
time and space and then doing on the spot checks and experiments to 
confirm our hunches. This, says Schon, is the difference between 
social inquiry and social science. New kinds of inquiry, measurement, 
and documentation similar to those Schon describes elsewhere have 
been referred to as action science (Argyris, Putnam, and Smith 1985) 
and design experiments (Shulman, 1994). 
If the university is to embrace the philosophy of wisdom, it must 
give place to these broader interpretations of inquiry. Indeed, this 
process has already begun. Throughout the academy-in mathemat-
ics, economics, anthropology, education, natural sciences-an unrest 
with the adequacy of current methods for studying complex systems 
is emerging. As Shulman notes, this movement is still marginal, and 
those within it remain in a vulnerable, fragile condition within the 
university. Yet, an awareness of the importance of this transition is 
beginning to appear across the academy. Proponents do not advocate 
the replacement of standard quantitative methods but an expansion of 
options for handling systems not well described within a quantitative 
framework. 
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The Contextual Nature of Knowing 
Through the centuries in Western civilization a dualistic view of 
human cognition has arisen. It has separated meaning apprehended 
through logical, deductive modes from those acquired through intui-
tive and aesthetic approaches (Labouvie-Vief, 1990). The rise of the 
scientific method produced the age of modernism characterized by the 
positivist, empiricist, rational-logical model of modem science and 
inspired by individuals such as Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and 
Husserl (Neville, 1992, pp. 5-11). The scientific method was devel-
oped with good reason, and it moved our inquiries beyond mere 
appeals to authority. However, as we have seen, the strict, narrow 
interpretation of empiricism by the positivists eventually led to disil-
lusionment (Rousneau, 1992, p.lO). 
This disillusion with modernism's ability to lead us to a "good 
world" gave rise to the post-modem movement, inspired by Nietzsche 
and Heidegger. Post-modernism is a complex term covering many 
different views. However, post-modernism ''rejects epistemological 
claims, refutes methodological conventions, [and] resists knowledge 
claims" (Rousneau, 1992, p.3). Post-modernism is a radical response 
to modernism's narrow viewpoint. It attempts to shake our compla-
cency while creating an awareness of the role of interpretation in 
cognition. We noted earlier that a third element of wisdom as described 
by Kitchener & Brenner (1990) is the recognition that our knowledge 
depends upon the interpretations we and others make. Perhaps no issue 
has obtained such prominent deliberation in this post-modem era as 
the debate over interpretation. 
But must we conclude that empiricism with its great achievements 
is incompatible with interpretation, or can we broaden our view of 
inquiry to include both logical and intuitive forms of knowing? We 
believe this is not only possible but has long been a part of the scientific 
method although not recognized by the narrow positivist view of 
science that the post-modernists criticize. For example, in physiCs, 
Chandrasekhar (1987, p. 65) cites renowned scientist Hermann Weyl 
as saying, "My work always tried to unite the true with the beautiful; 
but when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the 
beautiful." Weyl made this statement in reference to his gauge theory 
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of gravitation because he was convinced that this theory was not true 
as a theory of gravitation, but it was too beautiful for him to abandon. 
Chandrasekhar ( 1987, p. 66) notes that "much later, it did turn out that 
Weyl's instinct was right after all, when the formalism of gauge 
invariance was incorporated into quantum electrodynamics." Erwin 
SchrOdinger is also reputed to have said that it is more important to 
have beauty in your equations than to have them fit experiments. Nobel 
prize-winning geneticist Barbara McClintock indicates that what en-
abled her to reach deeper and further into the mysteries of genetics 
than her colleagues was an "openness to let it come to you", the ability 
to "hear what the material has to say to you," and "a feeling for the 
organism" (Keller, 1983, p.197). We mention these examples from 
intellectual giants of the twentieth century because they illustrate 
clearly that great scientists have always included factors other than 
empiricism in arriving at the truth. The question becomes not if, but 
how widely, we are to draw the circle of inclusion of non-empirical 
factors in the development and the testing of scientific theories. As we 
have seen, Nicholas Maxwell proposes that the envelope be pushed 
much further. By so doing, he believes we will accelerate our progress 
to truth and to a better and wiser world. 
Maxwell can find support for this thesis in the emerging field of 
cognitive science. Nersessian and others who study how scientists 
think have developed a process of cognitive-historical analysis. The 
main premise of this practice is that "the problem-solving strategies 
scientists have invented and the representational practices they have 
developed over the course of the history of science are very sophisti-
cated and refined outgrowths of ordinary reasoning and repre-
sentational processes" (Nersessian, 1992, p.5). Nersessian, through 
the study of the thought patterns of scientists such as James Clerk 
Maxwell and Michael Faraday, has shown that throughout history 
there is recurrent use of analogical reasoning, imagistic reasoning, 
thought experiment, and limiting case analysis, elements that clearly 
go beyond the positivist view of empiricism. She states that "the 
problem becomes that of how it is that scientists, working individually 
or collectiveiy, combine the cognitive abilities they have in virtue of 
their biology with the conceptual resources they acquire from the 
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various facets of their lives in a wider community" (Nersessian, 1992, 
p.38). 
But an examination of the history of philosophy shows us that 
there have been ways around the narrow definition of empiricism 
developed by the modernists all along: 
Of particular importance is the development within the Peircean 
lineage of a concern for value in experience. Moving down from Peirce 
are two tightly interwoven lines of descent. The first is the pragmatic 
tradition of James, Dewey, Mead, and others. The second is the adop-
tive lineage of Whitehead's process philosophy ... Like Peirce just be-
fore him, Whitehead went around modernism. (Neville 1992, p.18) 
The Development of a Wise Institution 
From this limited discussion of issues being debated within the 
academy, we begin to see how members of our universities, over time, 
have moved our institutions through stages analogous to those of 
Kitchener and King's model of wisdom. We recognize the first three 
stages of the model as representing a belief in the certainty of knowl-
edge based in authority. This can be seen as the foundation of early 
universities and monastic guilds during an age of divine wisdom. 
Stage four of the model represents the period during which the 
certainty of this divine plan came into question after the Copernican 
revolution. Stage five and the beginning of stage six represent our 
current post-modern debate in which logical, deductive vs. aesthetic 
and narrative forms of knowing are in tension. Stages five and six can 
also be seen as representing the current fragmentation of our multiver-
sities in which knowledge is viewed from the perspective of each 
discipline, and judgment about which perspective is best is often based 
on ethnocentric, disciplinary criteria. To construct a university based 
on the philosophy of wisdom will require us to move to stage seven 
of Kitchener and King's model. Stage seven represents a resolution of 
opposing views not through selection but through synthesis. It is 
generative in that new, more complete perspectives emerge from a 
synthesis of the old. This stage calls for new forms of connection and 
inclusion not only across disciplinary boundaries within the university 
but across the boundaries that separate the university from society. We 
have argued that this transformation is already in progress and will be 
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vital to creating an institution that is relevant and effective in the 
twenty-first century. 
What This Implies for Teaching and Learning 
Even if we succeed in constructing a university environment that 
exemplifies the philosophy of wisdom, this model will be insufficient 
to nurture wisdom in our students unless it extends to their instruction. 
William Perry's (1968) studies identified stages of growth in a college 
student's world view. According to Perry, the student first takes a 
dualistic "we-right-good vs. other-wrong-bad" view. Second, the stu-
dent accounts for diversity of opinion and uncertainty by seeing them 
as a product of a poorly qualified authority who hasn't found the 
answer. Next, he/she takes a relativistic point of view in which 
everyone is entitled to his/her own opinions. In later stages the student 
identifies the contextual nature of knowing and sees the need to orient 
him/herself through personal commitment, accepting the responsibil-
ity that such commitment entails. If we believe that the achievement 
of the later stages of development represented by Perry and the 
Kitchener and King model are the ultimate goal of education based on 
a philosophy of wisdom, this has several implications for the educa-
tional enterprise. 
The ability to recognize that our knowledge is only the temporary 
settlement of questions based on the best current evidence is perhaps 
one of the most important lessons from wisdom that can infonn our 
instruction. By allowing teachers to act as catalysts of learning rather 
than authority figures, we can help students to understand and appre-
ciate the uncertain character of our knowledge. The use of active 
inquiry and critical thinking will allow them to move through the 
stages of puzzlement, action, and reflection that John Dewey, long 
ago, recognized as crucial elements of learning. Engagement of stu-
dents in active learning is essential if we wish them to develop the 
habits of reflective judgment. Spectator methods of instruction in 
which students sit passively listening to authoritarian role models will 
do little to assist this process. Fortunately, advancements in learning 
technology have opened new avenues for learning which, if used . 
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effectively, can assist in providing students with environments that 
actively involve them as participants in their learning. 
But Nicholas Maxwell has challenged us to take the idea of 
uncertainty one step further. We have seen how the scientific method 
has replaced the method of authority and the certainty of fixed invari-
ant knowledge. Yet, within the academy we have also seen that our 
explorations are most often constrained to those areas in which out-
comes are, if not certain, at least quite predictable. Maxwell has 
challenged us to once again tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty by 
addressing the complex, unstructured questions that face and threaten 
our society-to reach beyond the surety of our certain methods and to 
explore new ways of knowing and assessing. If we are to take this call 
seriously and to create an institution that embraces a philosophy of 
wisdom, we must act to develop new methodologies for inquiry and 
encourage our students to join in the exploration of these great ques-
tions. 
An awareness that the knowledge we hold is an interpretation of 
our perceptions was also identified in our earlier discussion as a key 
element of wisdom. Often knowledge is presented to students with 
little discussion of the assumptions that underlie it. An increase in 
deliberation among students and within and between instructors and 
departments is needed to reveal the contextual nature of knowing. The 
abilities to identify our underlying assumptions and to recognize that 
our ideas are not context-free are major components of critical think-
ing. "When we are aware of how hidden and uncritically assimilated 
assumptions are important to shaping our habitual perceptions, under-
standings, and interpretations of the world, and to influencing the 
behaviors that result from these interpretations, we become aware of 
how context influences thought and actions" (Brookfield, 1987, p.8). 
To be effective in fostering critical thinkers who are contextually 
aware, it is important that instructors question the assumptions that 
underlie the knowledge, values, and methods used in their instruction 
and that they invite students to question their own assumptions as well 
as those of the instructor. This is a task that requires courage and 
openness. 
Unexamined assumptions can lead to insular views. We noted 
earlier that our universities have become profoundly specialized and 
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departmentalized. This departmentalization has led to bowuiaries that 
have lost their permeability between disciplines. Communications 
across these boundaries have become limited. Varying interpretations 
have made it difficult, and in some cases almost impossible, to form 
the types of collaboration necessary to explore questions that demand 
creativity and require contributions from a wide and diverse team. 
Schon (1994) noted that to increase cooperative inquiry we must 
model it in what we say and do. Beyond modeling collaboration, we 
must also give students practice in working in collaborative teams. 
Yet, much of our educational system is still founded on ideas of 
competitiveness. 
Implications can also be drawn for how we teach the knowledge 
base that underlies wisdom. Studies of problem-solving by medical 
students during clinical diagnosis reveal that the way in which infor-
mation is learned and stored can have a profound effect on how it will 
later be used. Traditional methods of teaching basic science courses 
interfere with the ability to access and use that information during 
problem-solving and diagnosis. The problem-solving and decision-
making of medical students has been studied intensely. Less attention 
has been paid to the real world problem-solving of students in other 
fields. Still, it seems likely that the difficulties experienced by medical 
students in accessing and using their knowledge is not an exception. 
If, as Secretary of Labor Robert Reich suggests, problem-solving 
is a primary skill that will be necessary for success in tomorrow's work 
force and, as Nicholas Maxwell and others suggest, problem-solving 
is essential for the well-being of individuals and the world they inhabit, 
then attention needs to be paid not only to what information we believe 
students must acquire as a knowledge base but to making sure that this 
knowledge is continually linked to the types of problem-solving that 
it is intended to undergird. One way of insuring such transfer is to 
involve students in consistent realistic practice and problem-solving 
throughout their educational experience. A system of education built 
on the philosophy of wisdom would require a reexamination of the 
place of practice and application in student education. 
Although many changes are underway in postsecondary educa-
tion, to fully embrace and exemplify a philosophy of wisdom will 
require the creativity and dedication of the entire university commu-
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nity. It is a significant challenge, but one we believe it will be essential 
to meet if higher education is to move successfully into the next 
century. 
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